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Abstract 
 
This contribution aims to provide a comparative analysis of the effects of corruption and 
lobbying on social welfare viewed as alternative methods of state capture. The core of the 
paper is the formulation of two models (one with exogenous and the other with the 
endogenous rent), a comparative analysis of the welfare effects of corruption and 
lobbying. Corruption is more favorable in terms of the welfare effects when the amount 
of the rent is small; conversely, when the amount of the rent is large, lobbying is more 
favorable. However, taking into account that the generation of the rent due to public 
policies leads to inevitably dead weight loss, both corruption and lobbing are inferior 
compared to the first best solution where no rent is generated at all. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, numerous economic studies have appeared dealing with 
corruption and lobbying – two concepts which are in direct relation to the phenomenon of 
rent seeking that came into the focus of economic research around the middle of the 
1970s and which was thoroughly researched by the end of the century. However, studies 
comparatively analyzing both corruption and lobbying as distinct forms of rent seeking 
have appeared relatively recently (Coate and Morris, 1999, Schultze and Ursprung, 2001, 
Lambdorff, 2002a, Damania et al., 2004, Harstad i Svensson, 2005, Campos and 
Giovannoni, 2005), so that comparative studies of the two phenomena can be considered 
to be at their beginning, especially in terms of welfare effects. The groundbreaking work 
in the area by Lambsdorff (2002a) offered a clear and comprehensive theoretical analysis 
of the two phenomena as alternative ways of state capture. 
 
This contribution aims to provide a comparative analysis of the effects of corruption and 
lobbying on social welfare viewed as alternative methods of state capture. The structure 
of the paper is in line with this aim. First, basic concepts will be specified since some 
controversy in the reference literature has already surfaced due to misunderstandings 
concerning the definition of terms. This is followed by basic methodological 
considerations concerning the identification of welfare effects. The core of the paper is 
the formulation of two models (one with exogenous and the other with the endogenous 
rent), a comparative analysis of the welfare effects of corruption and lobbying. Finally, 
the findings of that analysis are presented in the conclusions, followed by suggestions for 
further research. 
 
 
 2. Specifying basic concepts 
 
State capture in this paper is considered as the result of the influence of private interests 
on the formulation of public policies insofar that private (partial) interests of individuals 
or groups have a decisive impact on their contents, i.e. on the contents of the legislative 
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(statutory and sub-statutory) regulations and other rules and regulations that provide a 
regulatory framework for all economic activities. In short, state capture means the 
creation of a legislative regulatory framework which suits the interests of particular 
economic agents. This concept is somewhat different from the recently offered concept of 
“state capture“, (Hellman and Kaufman, 2001, Hellman et al. 2003 and Grey et al. 2004), 
presupposing only the existence of illicit influence on public policies, i.e. illegal 
imposition of partial interests. In contrast to that, the concept of state capture in this paper 
allows for legitimate influence on public policies as a necessary condition for the 
comparative analysis of legal and illegal influence of this kind. By the introduction of 
legal influence on public policies the concept of state capture in this paper comes close to 
the concept of the regulatory capture (Posner, 1971, Stigler, 1971, and Peltzman, 1976), a 
notion from the economic theory of regulation. It is assumed that state capture can be 
achieved in one of two alternative manners: through corruption and through lobbying, 
which is fundamentally different from the narrow Hellman-Kaufman's concept of state 
capture. This approach is in accordance with the basic findings of both the economic 
theory of regulations (Peltzman, 1989), and the theory of the competition of interest 
groups over state capture (Becker, 1983 and 1985). 
 
Following Murphy et al. (1993), the term rent seeking behavior will be taken to embrace 
all redistributive activities, that is, those activities which are aimed at the redistribution of 
welfare/wealth and which engage resources. In this respect, corruption and lobbying are 
viewed as distinctive forms of rent seeking. The issue of defining corruption in the case 
of state capture gives rise to substantial analytical problems. Lambsdorff (2002a) starts 
from the principal-agent model and draws the conclusion that corruption takes place 
“when an agent trespasses on the rules set up by the principal by colluding with third 
parties to promote his own benefit.”  However, one could ask which “rules set up by the 
principal” are violated in the formulation of a legislative framework favoring the partial 
interests of some economic agents. The point is that state capture encompasses 
formulating, rather than breaking rules. This is why Lambsdorff himself suggests that the 
principal-agent model may not be a suitable conceptual framework for the definition of 
corruption in the case of state capture and proposes (following the suggestion put by 
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Heidenheimer et al. 1989) that the definition should also embrace the welfare effects. In 
other words, he maintains that the definition of corruption in state capture should be 
based on the comparison of the welfare in the case of first best solution with the outcome 
in case of corruption. If the allocation of resources differs from the first best solution 
creating a welfare loss, then corruption as a method of state capture exists. The problem 
with this definition is that it also covers lobbying as a method for influencing public 
policies – lobbying results in state capture and allocative distortions, i.e. a departure from 
the first best solution accompanied by a corresponding welfare loss. This is why we 
should turn to some other definitions of corruption.  
 
Corruption as a method of state capture is fundamentally different from administrative 
corruption which entirely concerns the implementation of public policies, regulations and 
rules. There is no direct link between administrative corruption and the corruption which 
results in state capture.2 This is why it is questionable whether the definition of 
administrative corruption can serve as the basis for the definition of corruption in the case 
of state capture. One of the best and the most useful operational definitions of corruption 
“as the intentional non-compliance with the arm’s-length principle aimed at deriving 
some advantage for one self or related individuals from this behavior” (Tanzi, 1995), was 
developed for the needs of defining administrative corruption3. In the case of state 
capture one could ask what “non-compliance with the arm’s-length principle” means. 
This can be answered by defining the actions of public policy makers, for example, the 
actions of a legislative body, i.e. the members of the parliament: compliance with the 
arm’s-length principle (for example by voting in favor of a law) presupposes the identical 
relation of a parliamentarian to all voters, or at least to those who elected him, 
irrespective of their partial interests. If such arm’s-length principle is abandoned for 
“deriving some advantage”, corruption exists, regardless whether the outcome is reduced 
                                                 
2 Later in the paper various indirect relations between state capture (regardless of whether achieved through 
lobbying or through corruption) and administrative corruption will be analyzed. This relation is the central 
topic of some of the recent contributions (Damania et al., 2004). 
3 The above definition of corruption is in terms of precision and the applicability in the case of 
administrative corruption superior to the widely spread but less precise definition of corruption as «the 
abuse of powers for personal gain» which is a slight modification of the traditional definition of coruption 
(Nye, 1967), related to the World Bank and its research on the phenomenon. 
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welfare or not, that is, what the effect of such action on the part of the legislative body is 
on the allocation of resources. 4
 
However, the dilemma has not been resolved yet, especially in terms of the analytical 
separation of corruption and lobbying. Both “deriving some advantage” and “non-
compliance with the arm’s-length principle” in the case of legislative branch of 
government can also relate to lobbying. In order to differentiate between the two 
phenomena, it is necessary first to define lobbying in the case of state capture. 
 
In this paper lobbying is defined as strategic influence exerted on a public policies and its 
formulation in line with the partial interests of some group or an individual. Sometimes 
when defining lobbying the existence of an interest group is implied, that is, lobbying is 
taken to involve (as a necessary condition) the representation of interests of at least two 
economic agents (Lambsdorf, 2002a). However, the existence of several agents who join 
forces in order to impose their own partial interest should not be regarded as a necessary 
condition to call an instance of strategic influence on public policies lobbying. It is 
implicitly assumed that lobbying is legal.5
 
Since both lobbying and corruption are the imposition of partial interest in the processes 
of formulation and adoption of public policies, i.e. that they aim at the introduction and 
maintenance (safeguarding) of a public policies which supports the partial interests of the 
corruptor or the person on whose behalf it was lobbied, the question arises what the 
conceptual as well as the operational definition is of the difference between corruption 
                                                 
4 Hereafter state capture will apply exclusively to the capture of legislative authorities. This is not to 
exclude the possibility that some other branches of governance, at least in principle, can cause changes in 
public policies, but, for the sake of the clarity of the study, it will be assumed that it is the exclusive 
responsibility of legislative power. More on the controversy surrounding state capture see: Begović (2006).   
 
5 Sometimes (Damania et al., 2004, Harstad and Svensson, 2005, and Campos and Goivannoni, 2005) all 
forms of strategic influence on public policies are called lobbying while the term corruption is taken to 
mean administrative corruption only. Analytically speaking, such an approach is not desirable since it 
practically excludes the possibility of illegal influence on the formulation of public policies. 
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and lobbying.6 Only when that difference is specified, one can begin a comparative 
analysis of the two methods of influencing public policies (state capture methods) in 
order to explore their welfare effects. 
 
The first significant difference between the two rent seeking methods is that corruption is 
prohibited by the law while lobbying is not. However, analytically speaking, such 
distinction does not prove very useful. First, the difference between legal and illegal is 
endogenous (Lambsdorff, 2002a). For example, a greedy ruler can impose regulations 
legalizing corruption or some of its forms, in order to maximize the benefits (cash 
streams) he receives. Furthermore, there are considerable variations between countries 
(jurisprudences) concerning what is legal regarding imposing one’s partial interests. In 
some countries a particular form of exerting influence is considered lobbying, while in 
others the very same form is taken to be corruption. For example, direct financing of an 
election campaign is lawful in some jurisprudence, while in others it is not. Political 
scandals on the daily basis in many countries show that the line has become increasingly 
vague and is easily overstepped. The other drawback to the above distinction between 
corruption and lobbying is that it is a tautology and analytically quite poor. It provides 
very few information which activities, in terms of their content are corruption (illegal) 
and which are lobbying (lawful). 
 
However, what is important, and what stems from this definition is that the very illegality 
of corruption incurs its own specific transaction costs.7 Corruption at the same time 
represents the transfer of wealth (from a corruptor to the corrupted), but also a contract 
upon which such transfer is achieved, specifying also the favor that should be exchanged 
in that transaction. Since the contract is illegal, in the case of a breach of contractual 
obligations, the parties cannot refer to the courts to settle the dispute and enforce their 
contract; rather, the contracting parties must devise a mutually acceptable mechanism for 
                                                 
6 There is a need to make a distinction between advocacy and lobbying. Advocacy is the promotion of 
certain ideas, i.e. public policies, but not on behalf of some specific interest groups and individuals. 
Therefore someone may, for example, urge ideas relating to high tariff protection due to his belief that such 
protection is desirable (an advocate of protectionist ideas from economic, political or purely ideological 
convictions) and not because such protection favors domestic manufacturers to the detriment of consumers.  
7 This does not mean that lobbying does not generate transaction costs. The point is that in case of 
corruption some specific costs exist that do not exist in the case of lobbing.  
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the contract enforcement, that is, prevent the other side from defaulting, and that 
generates transaction costs. In addition, the transaction costs of corruption include the 
costs of negotiation (the costs of the preparation of such a contract as well as costs 
involved in finding an official who is willing to make such a deal and meet the ensuing 
obligations) as well as the substantial transaction costs involved in the compulsory 
enforcement of such a contract since both parties have incentives to default. Then, since 
corruption is crime and punishable by law, the contract and its enforcement must be kept 
secret which can provide further incentives to both contracting parties to evade 
fulfillment of its terms. Finally, as Lambsdorff (2002b) suggests, the incentives for 
opportunistic behavior on both sides can arise after the contract has been thoroughly 
enforced which must also be taken into account when making a contract. This all 
considerably increases the transaction costs of corruption. 8
 
In other words, the feature of corruption that it is illegal/punishable, generates specific 
and substantial transaction costs, i.e. transfer costs – simply put, corruption is not free of 
charge. 9 Since lobbying as well is a specific contract whereby an obligation is assumed 
to exert legitimate strategic influence on public policies, a question may be put 
concerning mutual relation between transaction costs of lobbying and corruption, i.e. 
whether it is possible to arrive at an operational definition of the difference between the 
two through the transaction costs they incur. In fact, later analysis will reveal that the 
distinction between corruption and lobbying can be drawn on the basis of such costs. 
 
The next difference between corruption and lobbying ensues from the stated illegality of 
corruption and the respective legality of lobbying. Namely, that distinction, in principle 
makes lobbying transparent while corruption is not. This is why it has been suggested 
(Jain 1998) that transparency should be set as a criterion for differentiating between 
corruption and lobbying. As opposed to corruption, lobbying is transparent, it is done 
                                                 
8 Although the costs are, undoubtedly, considerable, a relatively small number of studies has dealt with this 
question so far including Husted (1994), Della Porta and Vanucci (1999), Rose-Ackerman (1999), 
Lambsdorff (2002b) and Begović (2005). The findings of the empirical research on the topic can be found 
in Begović and Mijatović (2001). 
 
9 Hereafter transaction costs and transfer costs in corruption and lobbying will be used interchangeably.  
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publicly, in accordance with the rules set in advance (it is more or less known what is 
allowable and what is not) which leads to two important consequences. 
 
The first is the possibility of monitoring of the process of influences public policies. In 
principle, such monitoring can produce profound effects since it is more difficult to bring 
pressure to bear on public policies making if such policies are contrary to the interests of 
the majority. By its nature lobbying is public, it comprises various public activities 
therefore allowing the other side, the one with the opposing interest to react and thus 
initiate competition between opposing interest groups leading to the equilibrium of 
opposing interests’ influence to the public policies. As opposed to this, corruption is by 
its character concealed from public scrutiny so that the public cannot know what kind 
influence on the public policies is at work, which creates a substantial barrier to entry of 
potential competing corruptors, i.e. those who would be willing to influence and change 
the course of public policies through corruption (or in any other manner). This barrier to 
entry of the competing economic agents is at the core of the second characteristic of 
corruption by which it is different from lobbying.  
 
This second characteristic and the consequence of this proposition is a specific industrial 
organization of alternative activities relating to state capture. Lobbying is open to new 
entries providing an opportunity for several individuals or interest groups to indicate their 
interests. In essence, lobbying boils down to the competition of various interest groups 
for state capture. Becker (1983) suggested that the winner in the competition is the one 
who manages to mount the largest pressure on the legislator, that is, the one who engages 
more resources than his competitor or puts them to better use.10 Therefore, lobbying can 
be viewed as a competitive activity – competition between interest groups with low 
barriers to new entries. Conversely, corruption is sometimes viewed (Lambsdorff, 2002a) 
as a monopolistic activity: only one corruptor is at work with the authorities (most often a 
legislative body) and receives a favor – a public policies serving his interests. Whether 
this view of corruption is quite accurate will be discussed later.  
                                                 
10 It is interesting to note Becker's suggestion that the interest group whose interests lie closer to the «public 
interest» has a better chance of success (capture of state).  
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 The point is that such a distinction in terms of industrial organization, if proved true, can 
have a serious effect on public policies. Moreover, the issue of industrial organization can 
be included in this analysis as can the size and the manner of organization of interest, 
lobbying or corruptive groups, which, in turn, can yield essential information providing 
insight into comparative welfare effects. Moreover, there is a substantial economic 
literature dealing with problems of organizing such groups, that is, the ways in which 
such problems can be overcome (Olson, 1965, and Pelztman, 1976). It is interesting to 
note that the larger an interest group is, the more it loses the character of the partial 
interest it advocates. Posner (1974) outlines a hypothetical, theoretically possible, though 
unrealistic situation: if all citizens of a society become included into the same interest 
group lobbying for the same interest, then it becomes a public interest (the maximization 
of economic efficiency, i.e. welfare in terms of the departure of the first best solution in 
terms of efficient allocation of resources). In other words, the larger the interest group, 
the less state capture occurs. 
 
The above consequences are substantial; they represent the contents of the comparative 
analysis of corruption and lobbying in terms of the welfare effects. The impact of 
lobbying as opposed to corruptive groups on public policies still needs to be studied, as 
do the limitations inherent in the organization of each group. However, at this stage of the 
research it is far more important to note that transparency as an essential trait of lobbying 
has not led to the operational definition of the difference between corruption and 
lobbying. The transparency in lobbying is undoubtedly far greater than that in corruption; 
however, this does not constitute a significant analytical advance. 
 
The next possibility for the definition of the operational difference between corruption 
and lobbying lies in the examination of the contents of these activities. Corruption is a 
direct transfer of welfare/wealth from a corruptor to the corrupted, in case of state capture 
to the one who formulates regulations (the legislator). This transfer of wealth (bribes) 
represents “deriving some advantage” from Tanzi’s definition of corruption resulting in 
the “non compliance with the arm’s-length principle”. At that, these benefits do not 
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necessarily have to be cash directly paid to the legislator; they can be donations for his 
election campaign, naturally, if his intervention has brought about a change in public 
policies to the advantage of the corruptor. 
 
Pure corruption is only a transfer of wealth from one party to the other. In other words, 
pure corruption is pure transfer, which does not incur any transfer costs to either party. 
However, as suggested by Tullock (1967, 1971), in reality every transfer generates some 
costs – corruption as well. In fact, the transfer costs in the case of corruption are the 
transaction costs of an illicit contract concluded and enforced by two parties. This means 
that overall corruption costs include the costs of transfer itself (a reduction in the wealth 
of the corruptor which is in whole transferred to the corrupted) in addition to the total 
transaction costs of the entire transaction.  
 
In contrast, lobbying, in principle, does not involve direct transfer to the legislator but 
rather includes all that constitutes public or other pressure on those individuals for the 
formulation of some contents of the legislation. Among such activities there are public 
relations efforts, various types of marketing, engaging teams of experts who in their 
public appearances put an appropriate spin on the facts, various study visits proving that a 
certain public policies, advocated by a particular interest group, has produced excellent 
results in a certain state and similar. All these activities entail engagement of resources, 
that is, they generate considerable opportunity costs. It is certain that lobbying can also 
involve transfer of wealth (a modest gift to sweeten a message), that is, welfare, (a paid 
holiday in a foreign country of choice, immediately after a study visit stay), but also the 
transaction costs of state capture, that is, the costs of such transfers, relatively (in relation 
to the transfer) far larger than those in the case of corruption. Lobbying is also a solution 
to the problem arising from the fact that direct transfers are forbidden and therefore no 
longer desirable as a form of state capture. Simple, direct transfers do constitute the first 
best solution (at least from the aspect of the one attempting state capture), but when this 
is not possible, lobbying is selected as second best solution. 
 
 10
Following Appelbaum and Katza (1987) as well as Lambsdorff (2002a), a relation 
between transfers and the total costs of the state capture (rent-seeking) can be specified 
as:   
 
,)1( xcz −=           (1) 
 
where x stands for total costs of state capture by an interested party, z for the total transfer 
of welfare (wealth) to the legislator and c is a parameter which stands for transaction 
costs, that is, the costs of the transfer. Parameter c takes the values: 
 
,10 ≤≤ c           (2) 
 
so that in case c = 0 there is pure corruption, i.e. a transfer without any costs, and in case 
c = 1 there is pure lobbying without any transfer of wealth/welfare from an interest group 
to a legislator. In accordance with the rent seeking definition, pure corruption, since it 
does not engage resources (no transaction costs), does not classify as a redistributive 
activity, i.e. rent seeking. The increase in the parameter c indicates the increase in the 
proportion of transaction/transfer costs in total costs, specifically, the scale from pure 
corruption towards pure lobbying. Is there a critical value of c where (if the value 
continues to increase) corruption turns into lobbying? Naturally, this value has not been 
established empirically but it is also certain that a convention can be set up in that respect 
(in accordance with the principle of methodological nominalism). However, what is more 
important is that relation (1) represents a conceptual framework for understanding 
corruption and lobbying as alternative methods of state capture. 
 
Intuitively, on the basis of relations (1) and (2) a conclusion can be drawn that corruption 
is superior in relation to lobbying from the point of view of welfare change since it 
constitutes a pure transfer, without the engagement of any resources, so that, 
alternatively, they can be put to use in the creation of new value, increasing the welfare. 
This conclusion is doubtless premature and its value will be put to the test in the 
following analysis. 
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 3. The welfare effects of state capture  
 
There are two main welfare effects of state capture. The first effect is the inevitable dead-
weight loss. The existence of the rent, the objective/outcome of state capture is associated 
inevitably associated with the existence of the difference between the price and marginal 
costs.11 The existence of this difference results in dead weight loss described in early 
contribution on the effects of monopoly on welfare (Harberger, 1954, Schwartzman, 
1960, and Kamerschen, 1966) – Harberger’s triangle representing the social costs of state 
intervention comparing with the equilibrium on the free (perfect) market. 
 
The rent generation/appropriation is the objective of state capture; however, the 
generation/appropriation of the rent incurs some costs. These transfer/transaction costs 
are the source of another type of welfare loss in state capture. They lead to rent 
dissipation (Posner, 1975) – instead of the rent being in whole appropriated by those who 
have captured the state, part becomes dissipated through transfer costs. Under certain 
conditions the whole of the rent can be dissipated – the whole amount of the rent turns 
into welfare loss. 
 
Accordingly, total welfare loss due to the state capture can be formulated as: 
 
,)(
2
pQQcQpW ΔΔ−+ΔΔ=Δ        (3) 
 
where ΔW represents total welfare loss, ∆p represents the change in price and ∆Q the 
change in the supply resulting from state capture while coefficient c (standing for transfer 
costs) was given above in (1) and (2). From (3), taking into account that the rent is 
it follows that:  pQQc ΔΔ− )(
                                                 
11 McChesney (1987) suggested distinction between „political” rent and „private” rent. In the case of 
private rent, there is no need for difference between price and marginal costs, because rent is created due to 
the indivisibilities and differences in individual technologies. Nonetheless, political rent is due to the 
government intervention and a necessary condition for that rent is difference between price and marginal 
costs. The rent considered in this paper equals only McChesney’s political rent.     
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demonstrating that total welfare loss is in function of the rent generated, i.e. the rent to be 
appropriated. Partial differentiation of equation (4) renders:  
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Q
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indicating that an increase in rent is always accompanied by an increase in the loss of 
welfare, regardless of the degree of rent dissipation.12
 
Consequently, state capture results in the generation of rent which, in turn, inevitably 
causes a loss in welfare – in any case to allocation ineffectiveness and when transfer costs 
are larger than zero then to production ineffectiveness as well. The specification of 
equation (4) indicates that this analysis does not take into account the issue of the welfare 
distribution – it is implicitly assumed that social welfare does not depend on its 
allocation. 
 
4. State Capture with Exogenous Rent 
 
Following Tullock (1980), one can say that investing resources into state capture, that is, 
the generation and the appropriation of rent (rent seeking) continues until marginal 
investment is lower than marginal potential (expected) gain (marginal amount of the 
rent), as in any other maximization, marginal values equalize. The balance struck can be 
represented by a formal model. Hence, it is of the utmost importance to set in advance 
how the rent is to be formed. If exogenous rent is assumed then the matter of balance 
                                                 
12 Even when there is no rent dissipation at all (c = 0), the equation (5) inevitably exceeds zero since ∆Q is 
always above zero in the distortion of resource allocation, hence the ratio in parenthesis is always bigger 
than 1.  
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boils down to the activities concerning only the appropriation of the rent. Moreover, since 
the rent is exogenous, the same trait is exhibited by the allocation ineffectiveness 
(specifically, the loss of welfare produced by allocation ineffectiveness). Consequently, 
total change in welfare will depend exclusively on the degree of rent dissipation. Starting 
from the assumption of exogenous rent, it is presumed that all parties to the rent seeking 
will compete for its appropriation so that the probability of a particular participant 
appropriating the rent is proportionate to his investment (costs) into rent seeking. In the 
case of n participants, this brings about: 
 
 
;,...,2,1, nji
x
x
n
j
j
i
i == ∑
α        (6) 
 
where αi is the probability that a participant i will appropriate the whole amount of the 
rent and xi  is the amount of resources he has put into rent seeking. According to 
Lambsdorff (2002a), the balance can be easily determined if we assume that all 
participants are neutral in relation to risk, that they act in a symmetrical manner and that 
they cannot exert influence one upon the other (which also excludes collusion). The 
maximization of the expected profit from rent seeking (αiR - xi ) requires: 
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Equation (7) can be solved through the introduction of the assumption of symmetry: xi  =   
xj =   x. Such a solution brings about Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Solving equation (7) by x 
results in an equal level of investment in rent seeking/state capture by all participants: 
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,12 Rn
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while total investment in the rent seeking/state capture is: 
 
,1 R
n
nxnS −==          (9) 
 
which does not represent the loss in welfare, since it should be reduced by the amount of 
pure transfers arising from state capture. Consequently, the welfare loss is:13
 
( ) .1 R
n
ncxncSc −==         (10) 
 
It is certain that the reduction in the contribution of transfer (the increase in the transfer 
costs, that is, transaction costs) and the increase in the number of participants result in an 
increase in the loss of welfare since: 
 
( ) 01 >−=∂
∂ R
n
n
c
Sc ;    for every n > 1,      
 (11)  
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If the established equilibrium magnitude of rent seeking were used in accordance with 
Lambsdorff (2002a) for the comparison of the effects of corruption and lobbying on 
welfare, it is certain that in this respect corruption would be more favorable. Firstly, 
corruption results in a drop in the value of the coefficient c, that is, it raises the proportion 
                                                 
13 Dead weight loss is not included in total welfare loss. Since rent is exogenous, deadweight loss is also 
exogenous 
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of the transfer in the total amount of funds engaged in state capture, thereby reducing the 
dissipation of resources. Secondly, since the reduction in the number of prospective 
participants in state capture results in a drop in the loss of welfare (unless there is 
competition for the appropriation of the rent, that is, if n =1, there would be no loss of 
welfare at all in this respect) Lambsdorff (2002a) implicitly assumes (but does not 
provide evidence) that in the case of corruption there are fewer participants than in the 
case of lobbying and that, consequently, corruption produces lower loss of welfare. 
 
This finding should be viewed in the framework of two considerations: firstly, in the case 
of corruption it is not the difference between the expected amount of rent and the 
investment that is maximized, rather the maximization changes into seeking conditions 
maximizing the value of the following difference:  
 
[ ] [ ,)1( iii xkpxRp +−−− ]α         (13) 
 
where p represents the probability of the corruption being discovered, i.e. that the culprit 
is apprehended/convicted, k is the punishment set by the law for corruption (bribing) 
while all other variables are the same as in equation (7). The extreme of this equation will 
yield the equilibrium amount of resources which a single participant of corruption has 
invested in state capture: 
 
,1)1( 2 Rn
npx −−=          (14) 
 
whereby total welfare loss is:  
 
( ) .1)1( R
n
ncpxncSc −−==         (15) 
 
If the probability of discovery equals 1, that is, if it is certain that corruption will be 
uncovered, it will not happen since the condition has not been met. If the probability 
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equals zero, equations (14) and (15) become equations (8) and (9) whereby corruption 
becomes lobbying since effectively it is not prohibited (punishable) any more. 
Accordingly, hereafter lobbying will be viewed as a special case of corruption where p = 
0. 
 
The second remark concerns the statement that lobbying engages more participants than 
corruption leading to the conclusion that corruption is superior in terms of the change in 
welfare. Formally viewed, resources will be invested into lobbying if the following 
criterion is met: 
 
,0>− ii xRα           (16) 
 
while corruption will be invested into if: 
 
[ ] [ ,)1( iii xkpxRp +>−− ]α         (17) 
 
so that if the condition 0 < p ≤ 1, is met, the barrier to entry to corruption is higher than 
the one to enter lobbying and it can be assumed that ceteris paribus corruption will have 
fewer participants than lobbying. If  p = 1, there is an absolute barrier to corruption while 
with the decrease in p and its approach to zero the difference between relative barriers to 
entry either corruption or lobbying decreases and disappears at p = 0. In other words, all 
that reduces the possibility of corruption being detected also reduces the difference in the 
number of participants in state capture between corruption and lobbying thus reducing the 
advantages of corruption in term of welfare effects. Two factors are of importance for the 
value of p. One is the level of rule of law, i.e. capacity and commitment of the 
government/state to detect and punish the criminal act of corruption (thus acting as a 
deterrent). The weaker the government/state, the more the rule of law is in jeopardy the 
wider the incidence of corruption becomes, the number of participant increases thus 
reducing the advantage of the corruption regarding the welfare effects. The other factor is 
specialization of corruptors improving their efficiency in corruption which reduces the 
possibility of detection at the given level of capacity and commitment of the 
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government/state to deal with it. This can be acerbated by potential cooperation 
(collusion) of competing corruptors at least concerning the secrecy of the corruptive deals 
they are involved in.  
 
This analysis leads back to the already raised question of the industrial organization of 
state capture, that is, rent seeking, demonstrating that the value of parameter p is its key 
factor. If p = 0, corruption is, in effect, legalized, entry into the state capture activity is 
completely free and a large number of competitors appear. The increase in the parameter 
p results in the creation of different entry conditions for the new entries into corruption or 
lobbying so that relative barriers to entry of corruption become higher than those to 
lobbying – the number of corruptors falls in comparison with the number of those who 
influence public policies through lobbying. Finally, if p = 1, the total elimination of 
corruption is effected, so only lobbyists remain in the activity of state capture. 
 
The examination of the model with exogenous rent demonstrates that the prima facie  
unexpected conclusion that, in state capture, corruption regarding its welfare effects is 
better than lobbying has not been disproved; it has, however, been somewhat 
supplemented through the examination of factors affecting the degree of difference in 
welfare effects. However, the key problem of such an examination of the comparative 
effects of corruption and welfare lies in the assumption of the exogenous rent. 
 
This assumption runs almost contrary to the very definition of state capture: influence on 
public policies. If the public policies resulting in the creation of the rent are exogenous, 
then it is highly questionable what kind of state capture is that at all? The state capture in 
this case does not concern the creation of the rent through influencing public policies, but 
rather, only the distribution of the exogenous rent. For example, one does not influence 
the regime of import licensing (quantitatively limiting imports and thus creating rent), 
may not even influence the formulation of the method in which such licenses are 
distributed, but exerts influence only on the allocation of such licenses and thus on the 
distribution of the exogenous rent. This is a typical example of administrative corruption 
which leaves virtually no room for lobbying, but it certainly does not constitute state 
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capture, i.e. the establishment of regulations biased to some private interest; rather, this is 
a classic example of a breach of regulations in force, that is, an abuse in their application. 
This is why the assumption of the exogenous rent should be abandoned and a model with 
endogenous rent should be put forward. 
 
   
5. State Capture with Endogenous Rent  
 
The key novelty in this model lies in the fact that the amount of rent becomes the 
function of investment into rent seeking. Accordingly, investment is made not only into 
the distribution of the rent, but also in its creation. Consequently, it is necessary to 
specify the functional relationship between the rent and the investment into rent seeking.  
  
Lambsdorff (2002a) suggested that the amount of the rent should be viewed as a 
increasing function of the investment into rent seeking. In other words, the larger 
investment into rent seeking, the larger the rent: 
 
.0);( >∂
∂=
S
RSRR         (18) 
 
The explanation of this relation is a bit controversial. Lambsdorff (2002a) maintains that 
the behavior of politicians (legislator) when acting for partial interests to the detriment of 
public interest results in a fall in their popularity, which, in turn, reduces the probability 
of their being re-elected. This needs to be compensated for through the enlargement of 
other advantages, mainly those related to the transfers, which, among other things, can 
(through the investment into the election campaign) compensate for the lost popularity, 
that is, the reduction in the probability of re-election. The more partial interests are 
promoted, the larger the transfers needed for such compensation. However, as opposed to 
the equation (18), this explanation points to the reverse causation. If the explanation is 
accepted, it would mean that the investment into the rent is the function of the rent, rather 
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than vice versa, which means that equation (18) is not an accurate description of the 
functional relationship. 
 
Before going any further into the problem, it is necessary to answer the question to what 
extent the rent is an endogenous value and what is the motivation of the participants in 
state capture. No doubt that the rent, in fact, is an endogenous value, but its maximal 
value is exogenous. The maximum value of the rent is achieved when marginal costs 
equal marginal revenues. The equilibrium/maximum amount of the rent depends on the 
elasticity of the demand and any increase in price above the equilibrium one or decrease 
in supply under the equilibrium one results in the reduction of the rent. Consequently, the 
maximum amount of the rent is endogenous – it depends on the elasticity of the demand. 
14
 
The objective of the participants in state capture is the maximization of the appropriated 
rent which means that public policies need to be so formulated as to bring about 
equilibrium/maximum in the rent amount, and respective prices and supply. The 
overriding question concerns the amount of investment into rent seeking and the public 
policies which will result in the maximization of the rent. 
 
This link can be examined through the example of two alternative politics: one is free 
market policy, for example, the absolutely free import of a good, while the other is the 
monopoly policy, for example, through quantity limitation of import, which imposes 
partial monopolistic equilibrium (the maximum rent). The first policy is the one 
maximizing welfare, the one in the public interest; thus the motivation for the legislator 
to decide on such a policy lies in the maximization of the number of votes he hopes to 
win, i.e. in the maximization of the probability of being re-elected. Consequently, 
following Lambsdorff’s explanation of the rent generation, one can assume that the 
introduction of public policies which maximizes rent requires investment of resources 
into state capture. 
                                                 
14 By its character, this equilibrium is a monopolistic one where marginal revenues do not equal the price. 
In the case of perfectly inelastic demand, the rent is infinitely large, while in the case of a perfectly elastic 
demand rent generation does not occur at all. 
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 Obviously, there is a competition of two opposing interests here. One is the public 
interest of free trade, i.e. the welfare maximization, behind which stands a wide interest 
group, the whole of the electorate (Posner’s hypothetical interest group comprising 
everybody), while the other is a partial interest of those who want to hold a monopoly, 
i.e. those who want to maximize the rent appropriated – the interest group of those who 
expect to hold import licenses with quantitative limitation of the imports at the level of 
monopolistic supply. Obviously this is the case of competition between two interest 
groups. According to Becker’s model, the group which excises stronger relative pressure 
wins i.e. captures the state. 
 
Accordingly, the larger the investment into rent seeking, accompanied by implicitly 
assumed unchanged strength of the opposing interest group, the higher the probability of 
the achieving the public policies which maximizes the rent. In other words, the amount of 
the rent is no longer endogenous (only the maximum amount of the rent determined by 
the elasticity of demand); rather, what is endogenous is the probability for the occurrence 
of the exogenous maximum amount of rent – the expected rent is endogenous: 
 
.0';)( >=∂
∂= βββ
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RRE         (19) 
 
The maximum amount of the rent R is exogenous, but the probability of the occurrence 
of this amount of the rent depends on the total investment into rent seeking (S), that is, 
the relationship between the investment and the political pressure brought to bear by an 
interest group opposing the occurrence of the rent (which is, for the sake of simplicity, 
assumed to be constant). 15
 
                                                 
15 This approach differs from Lambsdorff's (2002a) which rests on the assumption that the rent is an 
increasing function of the investment into state capture. Then the problem of endogeny is encountered since 
the equilibrium amount of investment into state capture in the model depends on the rent. The introduction 
of the assumption of the exogenous maximum amount of the rent and the endogeny of the probability of its 
occurrence eliminates this problem. 
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It is very important to specify the character of expected returns in the rent seeking 
activities. It is beyond doubt that the first derivative of the expected rent upon the 
investment is positive; however, it is disputable whether there are decreasing returns. The 
constellation in which there are interest groups with opposing interests leads to the 
assumption that there are decreasing returns in the rent seeking: 
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In general (both in corruption and in lobbying) the equilibrium is achieved through the 
maximization of the difference between the expected rent and the investment into rent 
seeking: 
 
[ ] [ .)1( iii xkpxRp +−−− ]βα        (21) 
 
The equilibrium condition is of the same kind as in the case of the model with the 
exogenous rent. The amount of a single participant investment into the rent is: 
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where β’ is the first derivative of the probability of the rent appropriation upon the 
investment into rent seeking. On this basis, the equilibrium amount of total welfare loss 
due to the investment into rent seeking, i.e. state capture is: 
 
( ) .
'
1)1( β
β
Rn
RncpxnSc −
−−==        (23) 
 
In this case the dissipation of resources/rent increases with the increase in coefficient c: 
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i.e. the welfare loss increases with the increase of c for every n meeting the condition: 
 
,'βRn >           (25) 
  
which means that dissipation will occur with the increase in the number of participants, 
the reduction of the amount of the maximum rent and the rise in the decline of expected 
return (low value of β’) as well as with the rise in the parameter c. Accordingly, in this 
case corruption (characterized by lower values of parameter c) ceteris paribus reduces 
resource dissipation in comparison with lobbying. This finding is the same as the one in 
the exogenous rent model. However, theoretically, it is far more interesting the case with 
few participants, a high amount of rent and modest decreasing expected returns. In this 
situation, lobbying, which inherently incurs higher transfer costs, becomes superior in 
terms of resource dissipation. 
 
The examination of the welfare loss due to rent dissipation occurring with the rise in the 
number of participants in state capture renders: 
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Since the denominator is always bigger than zero, the character of the change in the loss 
of welfare due to resource dissipation occurring with the increase in the number of 
participants depends on the value of βR−1 ’. If:  
 
( ) ,0'1 <− βR           (27) 
 
 23
the increase in the number of participants results in the decrease in welfare loss due to 
resource dissipation. This means that if the condition (27) is met, lobbying (that is 
assumed to have lower barriers to entry comparing with corruption) has more favorable 
effects on the loss of welfare in comparison with corruption. The probability that 
condition (27) will be fulfilled increases with the increase in the maximum amount of 
rent if the decreasing returns of the expected rent becomes alleviated. 
 
By combining these two findings one can arrive at the conclusion that corruption has a 
better welfare effects when the amount of the maximum rent is small, i.e. in the case of 
those public policies which are of no great importance in terms of allocation distortion. 
When dealing with less important public policies, in terms of welfare, it is better if state 
capture is affected through corruption. On the contrary, if we are dealing with public 
policies which result in extensive distortion of resources, that is, large amounts of rent, it 
is better if they are achieved through lobbying. Therefore, corruption is superior 
exclusively when small rent is involved, that is, petty state capture. One way or the other, 
both methods of state capture take society further away from the first best solution, i.e. 
form the situation in which public policies creating rents have not been established at all. 
 
Another overriding question is whether in the state capture resulting in the maximal 
amount of rent, the distribution of that rent among the participants has already been 
accomplished or this needs to be done through another, special mechanism.16 For 
example, if quantitative restrictions (quotas) has been put on imports, has the state 
capture itself brought about the distribution of import licenses (within the quota) among 
those who have captured the state? If the answer is negative, then the distribution of the 
licenses can be undertaken in a transparent manner (by auction, for example) or through 
direct contact between the interested parties and the agency in charge. There is little 
probability that those who have captured state will allow the allocation of licenses in a 
                                                 
 
16 In some cases of state capture the distribution of rent does not need to be done through a special 
mechanism since this is performed by the market. For example, high customs tariffs create rent which will 
be distributed on the market, either through competition between domestic manufacturers or through their 
collusion. 
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transparent manner, which means that the way has been paved for administrative 
corruption concerning the allocation of the licenses. In this case, the transaction costs of 
administrative corruption also need to be factored into the overall effects of state capture 
on welfare. 
 
Consequently, total loss of welfare due to state capture, including both allocation and 
production ineffectiveness (both in the case of state capture and in administrative 
corruption alike) can be summarized as: 
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where AS represents the total amount of investment into administrative corruption. Total 
expected welfare loss is a function of the expected value of the rent:  
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Finally, there is a problem concerning the number of participants, both in the case of 
lobbying and corruption. It has been implicitly assumed that the problem of a stowaway 
does not arise, that is, that all invest the same amount (regardless whether in corruption or 
in lobbying) and take part in the results accordingly. In other words, the problem of a free 
rider, which happens to be the crucial problem in the organization of a collective action 
(Olson, 1965) has been completely disregarded. It remains unclear whether the problems 
concerning the organization of collective action are worse in the case of corruption or in 
the case of lobbying, specifically, whether they become worse in the case of illegal 
activities. First findings in the study of the organization of collective action in the area of 
illicit activities are still insufficient for drawing firm conclusions, especially in 
comparison with the organization of collective action in the area of legal activities. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The comparison of the effects of corruption and lobbying in the case of state capture 
required the overcoming many methodological problems. The first one concerned the 
distinction between corruption and lobbying; it was drawn on the basis of transfer costs in 
only two clearly defined situations (pure corruption, without transfer costs, and pure 
lobbying, without transfer itself). Other situations have not been defined in absolute terms 
but rather through their relative distance from the two extreme cases. 
 
It was demonstrated that corruption and lobbying could have different industrial 
organizations, which crucially depends on the probability that the criminal act of 
corruption will be uncovered. The rise in this probability creates higher relative barriers 
to entry and state capture through corruption so that corruption, in turn, creates fewer 
participants. 
 
The model with the exogenous rent showed that, due to the above distinction in the 
industrial organization of state capture, corruption is superior in terms of the welfare 
effects compared to lobbying since it incurs fewer transaction costs. However, the model 
with the exogenous rent proved to be unsuitable for the examination of state capture since 
it does not embrace the generation, but only the distribution of the rent, which is in 
opposition to the very meaning of state capture; however, in this, the model qualifies for 
the study of administrative corruption. The above problems can be tackled only through 
the model with endogenous rent. 
 
The formulation of the model with endogenous rent gave rise to several methodological 
problems, especially concerning the direction of causality. They were dealt with by 
introducing into the model the assumption of exogenously determined maximum rent 
together with endogenously determined probability of the occurrence, that is, the 
distribution of the rent. The findings demonstrated that the comparative effects of 
corruption and lobbying depend on the amount of the rent. Corruption is more favorable 
in terms of the welfare effects when the amount of the rent is small; conversely, when the 
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amount of the rent is large, lobbying is more favorable. However, taking into account that 
the generation of the rent due to public policies leads to inevitably dead weight loss, both 
corruption and lobbing are inferior compared to the first best solution where no rent is 
generated at all. 
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